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NO RELEASE BEFORE DELIVERY ON 
SENATE FLOOR, WEDNESDAY, 
SEPTEMBER 1 1 1§65 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA) 
VIET NAM: NARROWING THE ISSUES 
Mr. President: 
The fighting in Viet Nam is unabated. Military engagements 
intensify. Casualties on all sides increase. The streams of refugees 
rise. The extent of the devastation wrought is not known but it is 
obviously immense. Indeed, the costs of the heightened conflict in Viet 
Nam already dwarf. the billion dollar development program for the Mekong 
Project in Southeast Asia which was suggested by President Johnson in a 
speech in April at Johns Hopkins University. 
The President did not want it that way. At Johns Hopkins, he 
stated emphatically his preference for peace. He has since emphasized 
it at every opportunity. He offered then, and he has offered again and 
again, to enter into "unconditional discussions," in an effort to bring 
the war to an end. These appeals for negotiation, unfortunately, have 
either been ignored, dismissed with derision, or otherwise rejected. 
The efforts of various intermediary nations to initiate negotiations--
efforts which have been endorsed by the United States--have met a similar 
fate. These attempts, in short, have all drawn a blank. 
It might be concluded, therefore, that Hanoi and the Viet Cong 
have no interest whatsoever in negotiating peace. As if to reinforce 
this conclusion, Ho Chi Minh has talked in terms of a 20-year war. It 
would appear, then, that Hanoi is determined to continue the military 
struggle until the United States is driven into the sea. But the 
President has made clear that we will not permit that to happen and 
it will not happen. 
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There the matter stands. Hanoi and the Southern Liberation 
Front insist that they will not desist from the struggle and we will not 
yield. Is there, then, no alternative but a trial by arms in the three-, 
five-, or ten-year conflict which is projected )y some of our own offi-
cials or the 20-year war which was mentioned by Ho Chi Minh? 
Hanoi has indeed talked of a 20-year war. But from that same 
city there has also come talk of the conditions on which the war might 
end. Hanoi stated these conditions for peace in a radio broadcast on 
April 12, 1965, in response to the President's Johns Hopkins speech. 
The conditions were underscored subsequently by Peking and by Moscow. 
From these announcements, it would appear that negotiations to end the 
conflict are feasible, insofar as Hanoi is concerned, on the basis of 
these four conditions: 
1. That the rights of the Vietnamese people--peace, 
independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity--on the basis 
of the Geneva Agreements are recognized; 
2. That the division of Viet Nam into tvo zones will 
continue, pending peaceful reunification and that there will be no 
foreign military alliances, bases, or troop personnel in connection 
with either zone; 
3. That the internal affairs of South Viet Nam will 
be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves alone in 
accordance with the National Liberation Front program and without 
any foreign interference; 
4. That the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam will 
be settled eventually by the Vietnamese people themselves in both 
zones and withlut foreign interference. 
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I cite these conditions which have been set forth by Hanoi 
because it is important that we do not assume that we are engaged in 
Viet Nam against a group or a government which has no objective except 
warfare for the sake of warfare. On the contrary, it would appear that 
the leaders in Hanoi and the Southern Liberation Front and their allies 
in Peking and their supporters in Moscow have a very clear idea of why 
they fight and, in the four points to which I have referred, of the 
conditions on which they will cease fighting. 
In a similar fashion, while some United States officials have 
suggested, as noted, that we are engaged in a three-, five-, or ten-year 
war, the President has also spoken of peace and the great desirability 
of restoring it as quickly as possible in Viet Nam. There are conditions 
on which we, too, would be prepared to see this conflict terminated, 
although there may still be confusion both at home and abroad as to 
what these conditions may be. 
To be sure, there have been pronouncements from various sources 
and in general terms, about ending aggression from the North. There has 
been talk of aiding the South Vietnamese government as long as our aid is 
sought. There have been individual views of why we fight expressed in 
the press, in Congress and in the Departments of the government. But 
with all due respect there could be set forth, cohesively, even now, the 
basic conditions which United States policy regards as essential to peace 
in Viet Nam. Such conditions do exist. They can be distilled from 
President's Johnson's many statements on Viet Nam and other official 
pronouncements. And it may be useful at this time to set them forth, 
once again, in cohesive form. A clarification on this point may not 
only be helpful to public understanding; it may also be a spur to the 
initiation of negotiations. 
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In any event, t he Communists have not alone set forth the condi-
tions for peace in Viet Nam. He have also done so even t hough they may not 
be fully understood. Given the degree of American involvement and sacrifice, 
vre, too, have the right and responsibility to define again and again as 
concisely and as clearly as possible, the basic conditions for peace in t hat 
nation, as we see them. 
Indeed, it may be--and certainly, it is to be hoped--that the 
clear juxtaposition of the two sets of conditions for peace may lead to 
the "unconditional discussions" which are properly and urgently sought as 
a means of bringing this bitter and brutal struggle to an end. 
vlhen the official statements of the policy of the United States 
of the past few months are examined, it would appear to me that these con-
ditions for peace in Viet Nam have already been identified by the President 
and his principle spokesmen during the past few months: 
1. There must be a verified choice by the people of South 
Viet Nam of their own government--a choice free of terrorism, violence1 and 
coercion from any quarter. In this connection, the President clearly stated 
at Johns Hopkins that 'We want nothing for ourselves--only that the people 
of South Viet Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." 
2. There can be a future for South Viet Nam either in 
independence or as a part of a unified Viet Nam on the basis of a peaceful, 
free and verified expression of the wish of the people in each seecent of 
that region and in general accord with the Geneva Agreements. In a press 
conference on July 281 the President gave emphasis to this point when he 
said: 'We insist and we will always insist that the people of South Viet 
Nam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny 
in free elections in the South, or throughout all Viet Nam under inter-
national supervision." 
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3· There shall be a withdrawal of all foreign forces and 
bases throughout Viet Nam, north and south, ;provided ;peace can be re-
established and provided the arrangements for ;peace include adequate 
international guarantees of non-interference, not only for Viet Nam1 but 
for Laos and for Cambodia as well. This ;point was underscored by Secretary 
McNamara on June 16 when he said, "the United States has no designs whatso-
ever on the territory or the resources of Southeast Asia or any country in 
it. Our national interests do not require that we introduce military bases 
for our forces in Southeast Asia. They don't require that the states of 
Southeast Asia become members of Western military alliances. The ultimate 
goal of our country, therefore, in Southeast Asia is to hel;p maintain free 
and independent nations there in which the people can develop politically, 
economically, and socially, according to patterns of their own choosing, 
and with the objective of becoming responsible members of the world family 
of nations." 
Further, we are parties to the Geneva Accord of 1962 which is 
designed to achieve essentially these ends in Laos and we have expressed 
our willingness to join in a resumption of a Geneva Conference for the 
purpose of considering international guarantees of the independence, 
integrity and borders of the Kingdom of Cambodia. 
To these three basic conditions of peace, I would add two 
corollaries which all of us must realize are obviously essential if peace 
in Viet Nam is to be reached via the operations of negotiation rather than 
through the exhaustion of war. *: 
1. There needs to be provision for a secure amnesty for 
t hose involved in the struggle on all sides in Viet Nam as an essential 
block to an extension of the barbarism and atrocities of the struggle into 
the subsequent peace and, indeed, as an essential of that ;peace. 
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2. Ther e needs to be a willingness to accept, on all sides, 
a cease-fire and stand-fast througpout all Viet Nam which might well coincide 
with the initiation of negotiations. 
President Johnson has made it clear, time and again, that we seek 
no larger war. He has made it clear, time and again, that we do not have 
any territorial or military or other claim whatsoever in Viet Nam. He has 
said, time and again, that our only purpose is to help the South Vietnamese 
people to secure their own future, free from coercion. He has said, time 
and again, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions with anyone, 
anywhere, to bring about peace. From that policy, as it has been enunciated 
and as it is quoted, it would seem to me entirely valid to distill American 
conditions for peace along the lines which have been enumerated. 
To be sure, others may brush aside these conditions, even as we 
tend to do the same with respect to the conditions which they have set 
forth. Hanoi may reach, via an automatic reflex, the conclusion that these 
conditions, since they originate in the United States, can only mean domina-
tion of South Viet Nam by ourselves and those whom we support. And, in all 
frankness, we are prone to a converse conclusion, via the same reflex, with 
respect to the conditions which are suggested from Hanoi . The reflex of 
mistrust and disbelief is understandable. But unless the military conflict 
is to expand and to continue into the indefinite fUture, whether it be 3, 
5, 10 or 20 years of war, the degree of accuracy of these automatic re-
flexes must be tested in (t9gotiations . 
The high purpose of negotiations1 if they can be initiated, 
should be to see to it that the conditions of peace wherever they may 
originate come to mean in fact and in detail the domination of the Viet-
namese people themselves over their future . Beyond other considerations, 
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t his conflict involves primarily their country, their lives, their children. 
It is the Vietnamese people, north and south, who suffer most from its de-
vastating and tragic consequences. And, in the end, it is they who should 
have the right to determine the shape of the nation in which they live. 
That is where negotiations can lead. That is where the President wants them 
to lead. That is where they must lead, if there is ever to be a valid peace 
in Viet Nam. 
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